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In 2015, Purvi Patel became the first person in the
US to be charged, convicted and sentenced for ‘feti-
cide’ in relation to her own pregnancy. In 2013, she
had been admitted to an emergency room in Indiana
after turning up with heavy bleeding and a severed
umbilical cord. She claimed to have suffered a miscar-
riage and disposed of the foetal body on the way to
the hospital. The prosecution, however, argued she
had deliberately sought to terminate the pregnancy
through taking abortion-inducing drugs ordered on-
line (though the toxicology report found no evidence
of the drugs in her body). Patel was also charged
with neglect of a dependent, as the prosecution pro-
posed that the foetus had in fact been born alive, and
could have survived if medical attention had been
sought.1 Though the charges appear contradictory
(and the evidence for both was fiercely contested), the
prosecution contended that a person can be guilty of
’feticide’ for deliberately trying to end a pregnancy by
illegal means, even if the foetus survives; and that in
such cases, a person can also be guilty of letting them
die after birth. Patel was indeed found guilty of both
crimes – class A felony ’neglect of a dependent’ and
class B felony ’feticide’ – and sentenced to 20 years in
prison.
Indiana’s ‘feticide’ statute, introduced in 1979,
refers to ‘a person who knowingly or intentionally
terminates a human pregnancy with an intention
other than to produce a live birth or to remove a
dead foetus’, or to perform a legal abortion.2 It was
designed with violent third parties in mind whose
actions cause a pregnancy to end in miscarriage or
stillbirth (through intimate partner violence or as-
sault for example), rather than those who attempt
an illegal ‘self-abortion’. Indeed, the Indiana Court
of Appeals vacated the ’feticide’ charge against Patel
in 2016, stating that ’the legislature did not intend
for the feticide statute to apply to illegal abortions
or to be used to prosecute women for their own abor-
tions’.3 The Patel case, however, is by no means an
isolated incident and stands testament to the increas-
ing criminalisation ofmiscarriage in theUS,aswomen
– disproportionately poor and/or of colour – are con-
sidered suspect and punished for disguising illegal
‘self-abortion’ as involuntary miscarriage or stillbirth.
Thirty-eight states have ‘feticide’ or ‘fetal homicide’
laws4 that may be applied in cases of ‘suspicious’ mis-
carriage/stillbirth, and women have also been held
criminally liable for ‘reckless’ behaviour, like drug use,
that is deemed to play a causal role in adverse preg-
nancy outcomes.5 Since 1973, at least 45 states in
the US have sought to prosecute women for expos-
ing their ‘unborn child’ to drugs under a variety of
laws such as ‘child endangerment’ or ‘child neglect’.
In Oklahoma, a drug-addicted woman, Theresa Lee
Hernandez, was sentenced to 15 years in prison for
second-degree murder after her baby was stillborn
in 2004 and tested positive for methamphetamine.6
In February 2018, despite the clarification of the In-
diana law, Kelli Leever-Driskel was arrested after a
stillbirth and charged with ’feticide’ and involuntary
manslaughter based on her alleged drug use while
pregnant, and remains in prison.7
Faced with these kinds of cases, the onus on the
legal defence is to ‘prove it’s a miscarriage’8 or still-
birth, and moreover an ‘innocent’ one, thereby sum-
moning a series of binary distinctions– chosen versus
unchosen, intentional versus spontaneous, voluntary
versus involuntary, reckless versus responsible, and
so on – that could hold the key to an individual’s free-
dom from incarceration and other forms of punish-
ment. But from a broader theoretical viewpoint, what
kind of responsemight these criminal cases generate?
What have feminists had to say about miscarriage and
its place within the politics of pregnancy, and how
might this inform the challenge to its criminalisation
in the US and beyond?
Before proceeding further, it is important to ad-
dress some terminological issues, given that there
is no clear agreement on what a ‘miscarriage’ or a
‘stillbirth’ actually is. For example, the UK National
Health Service defines ‘miscarriage’ as ‘the loss of
a pregnancy during the first 23 weeks’, and a still-
birth as ‘when a baby is born dead after 24 completed
weeks of pregnancy’;9 but in the US, the point of dis-
tinction is usually 20 weeks.10 The terms themselves
are also contested, especially ‘miscarriage’ with its
connotations of failure (e.g. a ‘miscarriage of justice’),
or implication that the pregnant person is somehow
responsible (e.g. the ‘mis’ as in ‘misplaced’). In light
of these issues, ‘pregnancy loss’ is often used as an
alternative by academics and support groups– a wide-
ranging term that can cover the cessation of a preg-
nancy whatever its duration, as well as instances
where a pregnancy has been terminated but loss is
felt, as in a ‘therapeutic abortion’ for medical reasons.
However, this more experientially laden term is not al-
ways appropriate, given that lossmay not be felt when
a pregnancy ends; and as will be discussed, there are
political reasons to be wary of the language of loss
within a ‘pro-life’ saturated political climate in which
a sense of loss is more or less demanded as the only
intelligible and proper response.11 Accordingly, this
article opts for the more colloquial term ‘miscarriage’
to speak in general terms of non-induced pregnancy
cessation, as the priority in this instance is to avoid
emotional implications regarding the highly variable
subjective experience of this phenomenon.12
The designation of those who are/have been preg-
nant also runs into terminological difficulties, as
speaking of ‘pregnant women’ can be taken as exclu-
sionary of pregnantmen or those who are gender non-
binary.13 More inclusive gender-neutral terms like
‘pregnant people’ are increasingly preferred,14 and
impatience has been expressed in relation to feminist
critics who persist in referring to ‘pregnant women’
as a generic collective, or ‘the pregnant woman’ as
an abstract singular.15 Yet moving to gender-neutral
language is by no means a simple fix. In the first in-
stance, as Laura Briggs points out, the language of
‘pregnant people’ and ‘non-pregnant people’ has a his-
tory of reactionary usage: for instance, by those who
seek to deny protections against pregnancy discrim-
ination in the workplace by insisting it is not a form
of illegal sex discrimination.16 Moreover, the use of
gender-neutral language can feel somewhat obfuscat-
ory when pregnancy is hardly a gender-neutral affair.
Just as the capacity for pregnancy has consistently
been linked to femaleness and womanhood within
the binary sex/gendermodel, normative andmisogyn-
ist ideas about femaleness and womanhood – such
as feminine self-sacrifice, the unruliness of female
flesh, or the untrustworthiness of women’s testimony
and conduct – have in turn determined social expect-
ations and regulations of pregnancy. Indeed, it is
precisely this close association that makes male preg-
nancy such an ‘unthinkable’ phenomenon,17 whilst at
the same time, we see gendered notions of feminised
pregnancy carrying over into the paternalistic, patron-
ising and dismissive ways that non-female pregnant
people are also treated.18
So whilst de-naturalising the circular link
between ‘pregnancy’ and ‘women’ is essential to the
project of transforming dominant imaginaries of preg-
nancy and overturning the patriarchal, heteronormat-
ive, cisnormative government of reproduction, it does
not necessarily make sense to speak of pregnancy in
gender-neutral terms, or to abandon ‘pregnant wo-
men’ as an analytical category. This is especially true
when the intention is to examine how struggles for
control of pregnancy and reproduction impact partic-
ularly upon people understood to be women and girls,
although, as Michael Toze argues, ‘feminist critiques
of the regulation of female bodies can be expanded
to offer a mechanism for analysing the ways in which
trans masculine bodies are also regulated’.19 With
such considerations in mind, this article does use
gendered terminology like ‘pregnant women’ when
referring to gendered discourses and regimes of preg-
nancy that explicitly or implicitly evoke and impact
upon pregnant women qua women. But when the
use of gender-specific terminology is not vital to the
point, more capacious terms like ‘pregnant people’
are used in a bid to expand the conceptual frame.
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Miscarriage and feminist philosophy
For something that affects somanywomen so directly,
and is such a deeply gendered phenomenon, it is per-
haps surprising that miscarriage has received little
feminist attention. The reproductive justice move-
ment has forcefully challenged the singular focus on
abortion, highlighting systematic sterilisation abuse
amongst other coercive reproductive practices by the
state, and the continuing power of ‘the story that
says poor women and women of colour should not
give birth’.20 Accordingly, it has become more widely
understood amongst feminists that the right to repro-
duce is as much at stake as the right not to.21 But
the place of non-intentional non-reproduction – or
‘failed’ reproduction – within a feminist politics of
non/reproduction requires further theoretical elabor-
ation. So often miscarriage is treated as a private or
‘medical’ problem, ‘or worse “her fault”’,22 such that
its social and political aspects are obscured. Yet, for
many feminists, attending to miscarriage can feel like
risky business, when acknowledging that the range
of feelings it can entail – including sadness, loss and
grief –might seem to give credibility to anti-abortion
crusades that fetishise foetal life and tragedise its
ending. The claim that pro-choice feminism straight-
forwardly dismisses the foetus as a ‘bunch of cells’ is,
as Ann Cahill argues, something of a caricature; yet
the continued patriarchal appropriation of pregnancy
and assault on women’s reproductive lives renders
‘any attempt at subtlety politically dangerous’.23 Just
as ‘speaking as an aborting body… from within abor-
tion can feel impossible’,24 speaking from ‘withinmis-
carriage’ can feel equally so.
That said,work is being done to address this theor-
etical lacuna. Alongside work onmiscarriage and still-
birth within feminist sociology and anthropology,25
there has been a burgeoning interest within feminist
philosophy in the last few years. A special issue of the
Journal of Social Philosophy in 2015, for example, was
devoted to ‘Miscarriage, Reproductive Loss, and Fetal
Death’.26 The articles in this issue concentrate pre-
dominantly upon the ontological, ethical and social
questions provoked by miscarriage and foetal death,
rather than political or legal questions as such. The
opening essay by Alison Reiheld, however, does ven-
ture into this territory with her argument that mis-
carriage has been ‘enrolled’ in political debates and
laws around abortion and control over pregnancy due
to its ‘sequestered’ nature and ‘liminal’ status.27 As
a state of being ‘betwixt and between’, she contends,
miscarriage falls between a series of binaries includ-
ing ‘parent’ and ‘not-parent’, ‘not-having-procreated’
and ‘having procreated’, ‘life and death’, ‘abortion
and pregnancy’. Its ambiguous ontological and so-
cial status, according to Reiheld, means that miscar-
riage is not often acknowledged or spoken of,which in
turn makes it susceptible to being co-opted by discus-
sions and legal battles over the control of pregnancy
and abortion: ‘A thing poorly understood but too-like
states or events which we believe we understand is
quite likely to be drawn into debates over those other
states or events’.28 Accordingly, she contends,miscar-
riage becomes subjected to sets of laws and policies
(proposed or enacted) seeking to control abortion and
pregnancy: those which require pregnant people to
prove their pregnancy has ended involuntarily rather
than voluntarily; those which allow health care pro-
viders to opt out of treatingmiscarriage because it can
require similar techniques as abortion (most notably
D&C);29 and those which hold individuals criminally
responsible for their own miscarriages or stillbirths
where their actions or behaviours are deemed to have
played a causal role.30
Reiheld’s conclusion is that if miscarriage were
better theorised and understood as a ‘liminal event’, it
might not be so ‘easily enrolled in these other debates’
pertaining to control over pregnancy and abortion.
She acknowledges that in light of the persistent ob-
session with ‘fetal personhood’ in the US, it is unlikely
that we can ‘avoid entirely’ this kind of enrolment.
Nonetheless, the task for philosophers, as well as law-
and policy-makers, as Reiheld sees it, is to develop
an understanding of miscarriage ‘in its own right’ as
a liminal event that is ‘clearly distinct’ from the bin-
aries it falls in between. ‘Without a clear notion of
what miscarriage is’, she asserts, ‘I fear we will re-
peat again and again the negative ethical fallout of
failure to understand miscarriage’s liminality. The
result? Women who miscarry will again and again be
isolated, their troubles sequestered, their experiences
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and fates enrolled in debates which hardly bear on
miscarriage at all.’31
The call to treat miscarriage as a case apart does
make practical sense in certain situations. For ex-
ample, people experiencingmiscarriages or stillbirths
often find it distressing to be treated in the same
spaces within medical institutions as those having
check-ups for ongoing pregnancies or those in labour.
But at the level of principle, the argument to sep-
arate out miscarriage from pregnancy and abortion
needs to be further questioned. What makes mis-
carriage ‘clearly distinct’ from pregnancy and abor-
tion, as Reiheld contends? In what sense can debates
around the control of pregnancy and abortion be con-
sidered as ‘hardly bearing’ on miscarriage? Or, if in-
deed it is ‘too like’ abortion, does this imply we should
be devoting our theoretical energy to trying to separ-
ate them out?
Miscarriage/pregnancy
The first point to take issue with is the idea that ‘mis-
carriage’ needs to be differentiated from ‘pregnancy’.
Is a pregnancy that ends in miscarriage not still a
pregnancy? On what grounds can they be rendered
distinct? One distinction drawn by Reiheld is that
whilst miscarriage is ‘liminal’ in the sense of being
socially marginalised or ‘taboo’, pregnancy is surroun-
ded by a whole host of well-established, ‘clear cultural
scripts’, and is therefore ‘not liminal’.32 But debates
around the meaning of ‘liminality’ aside,33 this claim
obscures the fact that social support for pregnancy
is highly conditional and variable, depending upon
who is pregnant. It is certainly true that the lived
experience of pregnancy tends to be a ‘noisy one’,34
whilst the ending of a pregnancy through miscarriage
is characterised more often by silence. Yet as feminist
theory has long demonstrated, well-established cul-
tural scripts do not necessarily have positive effects,
nor do they impact upon different individuals and
social groups in the same way.
The dominant scripts of pregnancy in the US over-
whelmingly privilege a certain kind of white, well-off,
straight, non-disabled, compliant, feminine pregnant
subject. For those who measure up, pregnancy gener-
ates significant levels of social approval and support:
‘Pregnancy is bathed in sunlight,moonlight,God light.
What could be more beautiful than the pregnant wo-
man, deliverer of pure promise?’35 But pregnancy
can also be the source of ‘acute social shaming’, as
those who do not match this vision of pregnant fem-
ininity are consistently designated irresponsible and
suspicious.36 The figure of the pregnant teen, for
example, is a ubiquitous symbol of problematic preg-
nancy, along with pregnant bodies of all ages marked
by nonwhiteness, or a whiteness ‘contaminated by
poverty’.37 The ‘clear cultural scripts’ of pregnancy
thereby perpetuate a toxic pregnancy hierarchy that
is absolutely central to the politics of miscarriage
when, in a study of 413 arrests and forced interven-
tions on pregnant women in the US between 1973 and
2005, 71% were living in poverty and 59% were wo-
men of colour.38 In the past decade, arrests and forced
interventions have ‘skyrocketed’ according to the Na-
tional Advocates for Pregnant Women: at least 700
more cases have been reported, and those targeted
continue to be ‘overwhelmingly low income and a
disproportionate number are women of colour’.39
It may seem contradictory that the same people
whose pregnancies are marked as deviant and threat-
ening to social/national futures are punished when
their pregnancies are deemed to be in jeopardy or
end without a live birth; but this apparent contradic-
tion only lays bare how the professed concern for ‘the
child’ functions as a smokescreen or ‘cover story’40 for
wider political agendas and exercises of power. Scenes
of criminalised pregnancy depicted in the news – like
the disturbing images of Purvi Patel in handcuffs –
may also seem a far cry from the frothy magazine
articles and casual social interactions Reiheld has in
mindwhen she speaks of ‘pregnancy scripts’. But such
banal discourses are a primary vehicle of what Jen-
nifer Scuro refers to as ‘childbearing ideology’: the
‘scripts and rituals that underwrite socio-political,
gendered, and embodied expectations about preg-
nancy’, differentiating the ‘right’ kind of pregnancy
from the ‘wrong’ kind, and validating only its pro-
ductive aspects.41 Childbearing teleology promotes
a normative model of pregnancy as ‘all directed for
the sake of a child produced’, and is instilled through
a ‘medical and cultural complex of guidance and in-
struction’. Pregnancy guidebooks, for instance, align
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the time of pregnancy to the expected linear devel-
opment of the foetus, with routine temporal mile-
stones – the successive weeks, months, or trimesters
– serving as a ‘countdown’ to birth.42 Indeed, the
more proleptic versions of these narratives present
the imagined baby or child as already here, and the
pregnant person as ‘already a mother embarked on
a life trajectory of mothering’.43 As feminist writer
Angela Garbes recounts:
When I first opened The Healthy Pregnancy Book …
I was startled by an image … There on the second
page was a gray, delicately shaded pencil illustration
of a baby nestled cosily in a womb, its arms and legs
crossed. A thought bubble emanated from the baby,
carrying a firm message: ‘Mama take good care of
yourself so I can grow better’. I was only eight weeks
pregnant (my foetus was kidney-bean size ...), and yet
here was this fully formed baby admonishing me for
mistakes I was already making. ‘Do you really want to
eat that’? the baby asked incredulously on page 54.44
To be sure, many pregnant people do think of
themselves as mothers or parents to their foetuses,
and of their foetuses as their babies or children, and
engage in material and social practices that ‘inter-
pellate’ them as such.45 But as feminists have been
arguing for decades now, the externally imposed logic
that treats the foetus as a separate, autonomous be-
ing with interests, even ‘rights’ of its own, comes with
serious consequences for pregnant people, especially
when combined with ideologies of ‘total motherhood’.
The pregnant person, as Lauren Berlant contends, is
expected to ‘act like a mother’ to the foetus, but at the
same time, is effectively made a ‘child to the foetus’
through the de-legitimation of their agency and iden-
tity, as they become ‘more minor and less politically
represented than the foetus, which is in turn more
privileged in law, paternity, and other less institu-
tional family strategies of contemporary American
culture’.46 Another, less considered, consequence of
childbearing teleology is that ‘miscarried’ pregnan-
cies which do not result in a live birth are cast outside
the world of normative pregnancy altogether, and
shrouded in shame, stigma, silence or suspicion. If
pregnancy is taken as equivalent to ‘having a baby’,
then as Scuro writes, ‘anything short of these expect-
ations of equivalence becomes a site of harm and hu-
miliation’,47 even evidence of ‘child abuse’ or criminal
‘neglect’.
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Defining miscarriage as a liminal event in distinc-
tion to pregnancy therefore seems to somewhat miss
the point, as if the ubiquitous scripts and symbols of
normative pregnancy were not themselves the source
of the problem. ‘There are no greeting cards’ for
pregnancy loss, writes feminist anthropologist Linda
Layne,48 but surely this is not a reason for lament?
I am being somewhat facetious here, as the point of
the statement is to draw attention to the general lack
of social support for people who go through miscar-
riage – all the more jarring if it has been abundant
during the pregnancy and is then suddenly withdrawn
when the pregnancy ends unexpectedly with ‘nothing
to show for itself’.49 But the problem, arguably, can
be more squarely located in the dominant imagery
and logic manifest in pregnancy greeting cards them-
selves, rather than the lack of an equivalent miscar-
riage range. It is precisely the depictions of pregnancy
featured in greeting cards – where ‘being pregnant’
means ‘having a baby’ and ‘holding the future’ – that
make miscarriage appear as a deviation from preg-
nancy’s proper path. And however banal or seemingly
benign, the imagery and ‘noise’ around pregnancy too
often perpetuates the patriarchal convention of ex-
propriating the ‘unborn child’ from the lived pregnant
body, such that it apparently makes sense to proceed
as if the gestating foetus might require ‘protection’
from the body that sustains it and with which it is
intertwined. Indeed, the more banal and seemingly
benign this symbolism is, the more ordinary and com-
monplace it becomes.
Miscarriage/abortion
The second point to address is the idea that miscar-
riage should be properly distinguished from abortion,
to ensure that those who go through miscarriage are
shielded as much as possible from the negative ‘fall-
out’ from the ‘abortion debate’. Both miscarriage
and abortion have an abject status in a social con-
text in which pregnancy is equated with childbear-
ing and proleptic parenthood. Neither delivers up
the ‘the all-miraculous, all-coveted BABY’.50 Yet they
are often treated as oppositional phenomena, which
stems from the centrality of ‘choice’ to the construc-
tion of abortion as a political issue. If abortion is
framed as, above all, the chosen volitional act of an
autonomous individual, then miscarriage becomes
defined by its lack of chosenness and intentionality.
Ann Cahill thus identifies a widespread assumption
that ‘whether a pregnancy is terminated voluntarily
or not constitutes an enormous distinction between
experiences’,51 which is presumably behind Reiheld’s
claim that ‘the line between completing or accelerat-
ing amiscarriage and performing an induced abortion
seems clear to me’.52 But for as long as the rhetoric of
individual choice and voluntarism has been attached
to abortion, it has also been subject to feminist in-
terrogation,53 which gives us reason to hold this as-
sumption up to closer inspection. This is not to say
that chosenness and unchosenness are not signific-
ant or relevant to the discussion. In plenty of cases,
abortion is experienced as an empowering exercise
of choice, whilst many personal accounts of miscar-
riage describe it as an event that brings a depleted
sense of control and agency. Jennifer Doyle, for ex-
ample, writes of her sense that ‘the abortion I had
as a student at Rutgers in the 1980s was one of the
most singularly empowering experiences I’ve had as a
sexual subject’,54 whilst Angela Garbes describes feel-
ing ‘powerless’ as her miscarriage occurred.55 But the
line between miscarriage and abortion can also feel
much finer, as Scuro documents in her account of a
‘therapeutic abortion’ on medical grounds, which for
years she had classified as a miscarriage, feeling it did
not ‘count’ as an abortion because the pregnancy had
been wanted.56 Or as Barbara Katz Rothman argued
in The Tentative Pregnancy over thirty years ago: ‘The
decision to abort a foetus with spina bifida when you
live in a fourth-floorwalkup in a city designedwithout
access for wheelchairs is not really an exercise in free
choice.’57
There is clearly a danger in highlighting these
kinds of fine lines. In the first instance, the examples
taken above from Scuro and Katz Rothman can easily
be made to fit the normative narrative of the ‘right’
kind of abortion: the regretful one involving a moral
dilemma, or a difficult and painful choice in response
to extraneous circumstances.58 This narrative be-
longs to what Erica Millar calls the ‘mushy middle’
that is ‘at once pro-choice and anti-abortion’, profess-
ing support for women to choose and have abortions,
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‘so long as they feel “really, really bad” about them’.59
Narratives of abortion as a ‘choiceless choice’60 can
also be summoned in support of the ‘pro-life’ claim
that women are ‘victims’ of abortion as much as
the ‘unborn’, as no woman in their right mind or in
the right circumstances would ever choose abortion.
As Millar demonstrates, since the early 1980s, the
transnational anti-abortion movement has ‘increas-
ingly shifted rhetorical focus away from protecting
foetal life to feigning equal concern with the impact
of abortion on women’.61 This turns on reframing
abortion as ‘loss’ rather than ‘murder’, and transpos-
ing the foetus into ‘a constant, absent presence in
the woman’s life, constantly judging her for making
the wrong decision and retrospectively organising
her pregnancy as involving an eternal relationship
between a mother and her child.’62 The ‘wrongness’
of the abortion choice is recast as a wrong against
women themselves and their ‘maternal nature’, such
that womenneed to be protected from the bad choices
they might make under the spell of feminist doctrine.
Choice is thereby voided through claims that abortion
could never be a valid choice, and, further, that it is a
‘loss even when it is chosen’.63
So if the distinction between miscarriage and
abortion hinges upon individual choice, voluntarism
and intention, then in practice it is being eroded quite
effectively by anti-abortion campaigners, through the
language of loss and mobilisation of what Millar calls
‘foetocentric grief’. At the same time, the presump-
tion ofmiscarriage as a passive event that is undergone
rather than chosen is being eroded through the reg-
ulatory discourses of ‘foetal motherhood’64 that not
only maternalise abortion but responsibilise all preg-
nant people for the outcomes of their pregnancies. As
Pam Lowe argues, ‘every choice that a woman makes,
from eating to prenatal testing, is taken as evidence
of her willingness to perform idealised motherhood
…whilst nominally “choices” can be made, there is of-
ten only one “right” choice for responsible women to
make’.65 Hence, whilst it may be recognised that mis-
carriage itself is not actively chosen or intended, the
pregnant person can nevertheless be held respons-
ible for their ‘choices’ up to that point. This logic
reaches its dreadful realisation through the criminal
justice system when women are arrested, prosecuted
and charged for ‘culpable miscarriage’, the message
being that it does not matter whether the ending of a
pregnancy was chosen, intended or undertaken delib-
erately, because a pregnant individual can still be held
responsible for failing to ‘act like a mother’. This is
clearly recognised by Dennis Muñoz, a lawyer repres-
enting two imprisoned women in El Salvador (where
there is a total ban on abortion), who contends that
the miscarriage/abortion distinction has become es-
sentially irrelevant in the eyes of police and prosec-
utors: ‘They say women are responsible for care of the
foetus … There is a lot of ignorance and no intention
to investigate. There’s also religious dogma. I prove
it’s a miscarriage but the courts don’t care.’66
All this might well suggest that the feminist re-
sponse to the ‘merging’ of miscarriage and abortion67
should be to do just the opposite and reinforce the
distinction between the two. But if such a distinc-
tion depends upon a reinforcement of chosenness/un-
chosenness as the decisive criterion, or presumptions
about which pregnancies are ‘willed’ and ‘wanted’
and which are not, this only brings us back to all the
problems that ensue when individual choice, action
and emotion are placed front and centre of reproduct-
ive politics. The marshalling of individual autonomy
– ‘My body, My choice’ – certainly carries a power-
ful charge as an act of reclaiming what patriarchal
ideologies and laws seek to obliterate; and meaning-
ful choice is an important condition of reproductive
freedom. But as reproductive justice activists have
tirelessly argued, in isolation from campaigns for ‘en-
abling conditions’,68 the mantra of individual choice
only serves to eclipse the gross structural inequal-
ities that materialise through differential access to
reproductive services including abortion, as well as
through modes of reproductive coercion, censure and
sanction. In practice, the apparatus of ‘choice’ works
for some but against others, when the moralised and
gendered responsibility to make the ‘right’ choices
and want the ‘right’ things functions as a form of dis-
ciplinary power exercised particularly over the ‘wrong’
sort of women.69 Further, as Millar points out, the
tables are easily turned when ‘choice’ is appropriated
and marshalled by anti-abortion activists. Whilst
on the one hand they claim that women’s choices
to abort are against their ‘maternal nature’ and hence
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can never be genuine, they themselves deploy the
discourse of choice when they assert that knowledge
of ‘post-abortion syndrome’, as well as incremental
restrictions on abortion, including mandatory coun-
selling and ‘cooling-off’ periods, ‘provide womenwith
informed and “real” choices’.70
What we are dealing with, then, is a terrain in
which ‘chosen’ and ‘unchosen’ may continue to hold
subjective meaning (in terms of how an individual
might understand and frame their own abortion or
miscarriage), but their political meaning has become
subsumed by powerful discourses of proper and re-
sponsible behaviour, and a consequentialist logic
whereby outcome, above all, is deemed sufficient
grounds for culpability. In response, what is required
is not so much a renewed feminist defence of indi-
vidual choice, but joined-up resistance to themechan-
isms of responsibilisation that put people who experi-
ence both abortion and miscarriage at risk of censure
and criminal punishment. This means suspending
questions about choice and intent, and reckoning in-
stead with the gendered, raced and classed norms
that position certain individuals on the right side of
social approval and the law whilst rendering others
reckless or suspicious.71 Whose miscarriage looks
‘too like’ abortion? If there is a ‘right’ and a ‘wrong’
kind of abortion, how does this relate to the ‘right’
and ‘wrong’ kind of miscarriage, and the ‘right’ and
‘wrong’ kind of pregnancy? How well is someone able
to narrate their miscarriage or abortion to meet the
requirements for ‘responsible decision-making’, ‘con-
scientious pregnancy’ or ‘innocent loss’?
It also means treating miscarriage and abortion
as issues of social justice, and reckoning with the
impacts, implications and costs of abortion and mis-
carriage – quite literally for those without adequate
medical insurance or who are gestating for money72
– in light of how they map on to wider social inequal-
ities. For instance, not only have impoverished and
non-white women in the US been disproportionately
affected by state-imposed restrictions on accessing
abortion, by the denial of federal funds for abortion,
by punitive welfare policies, and by the criminalisa-
tion of pregnancy, abortion and miscarriage; statist-
ics also show that those same groups are more likely
to experience miscarriage in the first place due to
factors including inadequate or non-existent health-
care, housing conditions, and the ‘weathering effect’
of systemic racism.73 When we widen the focus out
like this, what appears most significant with regard to
cases like Purvi Patel’s is not so much what the indi-
vidual in questionmay have chosen or intended–was
it deliberate? – but the conditions that make adverse
pregnancy outcomes, interventions and arrests far
more likely for some than for others; in which preg-
nant people may refrain from seeking help for drug
or alcohol addiction for fear of being reported to the
police; and in which the options for some pregnant
people are so severely constrained that risking a ‘DIY
abortion’ may appear as the only option.74
Conclusion: spectrum not separation
It is problematic to distinguishmiscarriage from preg-
nancy on the presumption that miscarriage is socially
marginalised whilst ‘pregnancy’ is socially supported;
or on the grounds that ‘pregnancy’ is child-producing
whilst miscarriage is not. It is also problematic to
treat miscarriage and abortion as categorically sep-
arate on the grounds of choice, volition or intention.
Not only do such distinctions frequently falter on fur-
ther examination; they are also integral to oppressive
social discourses of childbearing teleology and foetal
motherhood which, to quote Berlant, ‘retraumatise a
set of already vulnerable bodies: the body of the wo-
man unsettled by pregnancy and already exposed to
misogyny and the state; the impoverished, the young,
the often African American or Native American wo-
men who have had little access to reproductive health
support apart from a scandalous history of state chi-
canery…’75 From this perspective, it is not that mis-
carriage is wrongly ‘enrolled’ in laws and debates over
the control of pregnancy and abortion due to concep-
tual error. It is rather that struggles over the criminal-
isation of miscarriage are inextricable from struggles
over the control of pregnancy and abortion. When
pregnant people are treated as dangerous subjects, it
is inevitable that those who have experienced miscar-
riage or stillbirth will be ‘swept up’ into the criminal
justice system, at least those whose reproductivity
and existence have already been marked as a threat.
Accordingly, instead of trying to refine categorical
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distinctions and treating miscarriage as a case apart,
there is much more to gain from pursuing a politics
of solidarity and considering different pregnant real-
ities and outcomes together, and in relation to one
another. A powerful example of this kind of approach
is provided by the ‘full spectrum’ doula movement:
a rising form of reproductive justice activism that
seeks to provide non-judgmental support and care for
pregnant people however their pregnancy proceeds
or ends, whether in birth, abortion, miscarriage or
stillbirth.76 As Loretta Ross explains it, the inten-
tion is to ‘weave diverse pregnancy experiences into
a holistic service and advocacy model that challenges
stigmatised, artificial divisions among pregnancy out-
comes’.77 For instance, abortion advocacy and birth
advocacy are forms of activism that usually operate
separately, or indeed are presumed to be in conflict;
but full-spectrum doulas have promoted the idea that
‘abortion should not stand alone’, and instead be ap-
proached as ‘one part of a person’s entire reproductive
life. The same individual may have an abortion, give
birth, and then have a miscarriage’, and support and
care should be equally available in every case.78
The full-spectrum doulas provide a direct care-
giving service that works with individuals, but in
breaking down boundaries between birth, abortion,
miscarriage and stillbirth, the movement also paves
the way for pregnant/postpartum solidarity and co-
ordinated struggle at a broader level. Though the
‘abortion issue’ operates as a pernicious mechanism
of division, the full-spectrum approach enables us
to see the damaging effects of ‘pro-life’ policies and
logics upon all pregnant people and not only those
who seek to terminate, as the logic of ‘foetal rights’
renders pregnant bodies increasingly vulnerable to
unwanted interventions and procedures. Lynn Pal-
trow, for example, of the National Advocates for Preg-
nant Women, tells of an anti-abortion campaigner
who found herself subjected to a forced C-section.79
The full-spectrum approach can also mobilise col-
lective resistance to the normative ‘success model’ of
pregnancy as a ‘trap’ or ‘set-up’ that generates feel-
ings of guilt and shame even amongst those who do
deliver up the expected child.80 To be sure, it is not
uncommon for those who have been through a mis-
carriage or stillbirth to report feelings of resentment
towards thosewhose pregnancies continue to term, as
well as those who opt to abort. These are understand-
able emotional responses–especially within a culture
that pits women against one another – and should
not be weaponised as yet another source of gendered
guilt. But at the same time, recognition of ‘common
threats and threads’, in Paltrow’s words, can serve as
a uniting force to challenge the master narrative of
productive pregnancy and sacrificial maternity. Scuro
also proposes this kind of vision, writing that ‘Per-
haps instead solidarity will be found with the woman
who has miscarried, as she might recognise herself
in the woman who has aborted her pregnancy, and
again each with the woman who has “successfully”
given birth.’81
For feminist philosophy, then, the aim should be
to explore what philosophical analysis can bring to
the ‘full-spectrum’ framework, whilst also taking on
the foetocentric logics and value systems that divide
us and do such damage. The impulse to ‘rescue’ mis-
carriage from the ‘fallout’ of abortion politics through
insisting upon its difference may be strong, but in
‘turn[ing] away less from those who have experienced
miscarriage’,82 it is vital not to turn away more from
those who have experienced abortion. In particular,
there is a need for vigilance concerning the assump-
tions and implications that lie behind the idea that
it is especially bad for someone to be punished for
inducing an abortion when in fact the cessation of
pregnancy was involuntary. Of course there is a par-
ticular cruelty to being punished for something one
did not do. This adds the injustice of wrongful ac-
cusation into the mix, and if the pregnant person did
not want the pregnancy to end, a wretched kind of
irony. But who is to say it is necessarily less painful
to be punished for something that one has actually
done, especially within a cultural climate that is so
anti-abortion that even pro-choice activists refer to
it as a ‘necessary evil’?83 And if we entertain, even
for a second, the idea that abortion is something to
distance ourselves from, or that punishing miscar-
riage is necessarily ‘worse’ than punishing abortion,
we risk fuelling anti-abortion sentiment even further.
Whether or not the ‘crime’ was committed, the focus
should be squarely on challenging the brutality and
injustice of the punishment full stop.
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